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Senior Integrative Project
The Resurgence of Russia in the International System via Foreign Policy Strategy in the
Middle East
Abstract:
This independent study will look to analyze the various strategies that Russia has pursued in
regaining international influence since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Specifically,
it will consider how Russia has attempted to utilize its close proximity to the Middle East, to
implement change in the region to further advance its own agenda. The areas of focus will
include Russia’s military strategy, trade developments, and manipulation of soft power to
nourish positive perception of Russia within the region.

Introduction:
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a new era of international relations,
dominated by the unilateral might of the United States. The great Communist state had finally
collapsed, making way for a new world order in which Russia was all but irrelevant. Their
political system was overthrown, their ideology was defeated, and their economy was in
shambles. By 1991, the economy was in such a recession that it had contracted over 17 percent
and consumer conflation had reached 140 percent1. The new Russia, attempting to develop as a
democracy, did not threaten U.S. interests and remained relatively extraneous as this new era
unfolded.
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Times have changed since then. Now, many scholars are examining a new scenario, one
in which Russia regains its presence on the international stage. Stunning economic growth since
1998, during which the ruble all but crashed, has now transitioned into startling increases that
have led to a GDP growth of $1,312 in 1999 to $8,842 in 2007.2 According to one report, experts
now say that “at some time in the next 20–40 years, Russia will re emerge as a world power”.3
While some authors quibble about dates, there are few who argue about the eventual outcome.
The idea of a “Resurgent Russia” is quite prominent now, as Russia dominates more and more of
the daily news. Pertinent to this writing is the Kremlin’s interest in the Middle East, and how it
has utilized its newfound power to extrapolate on the current situations occurring around its
borders.
As Russia’s economic and political influence has grown over the last few decades, the
Kremlin’s focus has shifted once again towards the Middle East amongst other critical regions.
Today, Russia’s interest “in Middle Eastern affairs today is the most active it has been since the
heyday of the Cold War.”4 Thus far, the Kremlin has mainly grown its influence via military
presence, trade deals, and soft power through agreements with various Middle Eastern leaders.
The most poignant example of such military presence came in 2015 when Russia decisively
committed itself to the Syrian civil war. Russia’s involvement has become its biggest combat
employment since the Soviet-Afghan War, ambitiously launched despite not sharing a common
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border or having any kind of large independent support5. While there was some vested national
security interest involved, specifically in preventing “battle hardened Russian jihadists”6 from
returning home if the state failed, it is apparent to most in the international system that Russia’s
involvement was entirely meant to demonstrate their renewed power. This marks the first direct
intervention by both the United States and Russia in a military conflict with both countries
putting troops on the ground, heightening tensions to a level that has been noticeably absent for
several decades. While some have claimed that the Kremlin’s involvement could lead to another
“quagmire”, Putin’s decision demonstrably brought Russia back into the lens of the international
system. This paper will address Russia’s presence in Syria, as well as other military ventures that
it has pursued including military bases abroad such as in Syria (and it’s willingness to use other
nation’s military bases7) and its own internal development of its military for foreign deployment.

Literature Review:
The existing literature on great power rise and fall has a tendency to focus on the rise of
new states and the fall of dying states. What it does not do, however, is that it fails to analyze the
manner in which states “resurge” or return as a player in the international system. The literature
on the topic of resurgent states is heavily limited despite the presence of such vernacular in
newspaper articles and scholarly journals. The definition of a resurgent state and the manner in
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which states attempt to regain strength is rarely crystallized and remains more of a generalized
concept than a concrete analysis. Specifically, although scholars have acknowledged the growing
strength of Russia, there is a gap in the literature on the foreign policy initiatives that the Kremlin
has implemented to attempt to reclaim great power status. Although seminal theories do not
explicitly explain resurgent power, they remain instrumental in understanding the general
process of power transitions. This literature review will first outline the seminal arguments on
great power rise and fall and then it will seek to outline how these arguments might extend to
resurgent states.

International Relations Theory:
In understanding great power politics, it is essential to first understand the world in which
states operate. Over time, different schools of thought have developed distinct models for
analyzing states’ behavior and intentions. Such models allow political scientists to explain why
states pursue one policy or another and the manner in which they interact with other states.
One of the most central and longstanding schools of thought is the notion of Realism.
Underlying this theory is the reality that anarchy remains the most defining feature of the
international system in the absence of a supranational government. Such emphasis on anarchy is
typically most associated with Realist thought, since Realism assumes that the world is driven by
insecurity. Realist theory contends that the condition of anarchy makes security the first and
foremost concern of states. Mearsheimer, one of the most well known scholars on the topic,
writes that the first assumption of the international system is anarchic, although notes that this
should be taken to mean that it is chaotic or disorderly. Rather, it is an ordering principle

communicating the fact that the system is comprised of independent states that have no central
authority above them.8 The international system “never was and is not today a world state” as
stated by George Modelski, who claims that the system is a decentralized polity.9 Lacking this
higher authority, states are left to their own devices to protect and defend themselves from other,
potentially hostile forces.
The term ‘realism’ tends to denote a pessimistic vision of the future, with little
expectation of states changing their nature. Realism, as noted by Edward Carr, emphasizes the
irresistible strength of existing forces, insisting that wisdom lies in accepting and adapting to
these tendencies, rather than attempting to alter them.10 At realism’s core is the notion that
international affairs is nothing more than a struggle for power between competing, self interested
states.11 This struggle for power is considered to be universal, temporally and spatially,
regardless of social, economic, and political conditions.12
Not all schools of thought maintain such a forlorn outlook on the international states of
affairs. Liberals tend to be hopeful about the prospects of creating a safer, more interconnected
world. They purport a vision of a future without war, assuming that states can overcome their
differences to work together. Liberals claim that the world is on a slow but “inexorable journey
away from the anarchic world” arguing that trade and finance will forge relationships between
nations, and democratic norms will spread.”13 Liberalism emphasizes a drive towards global
markets, international organizations, cooperation. The championing minds behind such an

Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. P. 338
Modelski, George. Principles of World Politics. New York: Free, 1972. P. 216
10
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939; an Introduction to the Study of International
Relations. London: Macmillan and, Limited, 1940. P. 10.
11
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. P. 6.
12
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace. P. 17.
13
Ibid. P. 7.
8
9

ideology include John Locke and Immanuel Kant, convinced that states could put aside their
differences to create some of the international governing bodies that exist today. Today, the
scholars of liberalism envision an interconnected future in which states remain individual and
sovereign, but can also cooperate through a system of shared ideals and norms for the betterment
of all people.
A third body of literature is often discussed in terms of international politics, namely
constructivism. A constructivist mind sees international politics as the product of persuasive
ideas, cultural effects, and historical relationships to understand the current state of affairs.
According to constructivism, ideas always maintain importance, because power and interest are
intrinsically related to the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such.”14 In essence, the
world is a social construction made from the actions and beliefs of human beings. As Alexander
Wendt explains, the analysis of the social constructions in international politics is to analyze
interactions and the processes that these interactions produce and reproduce. These social
structures shape actors’ identities and interests, as well as the significance of their material
context.15 Constructivism acknowledges the international system as anarchical, but claims that it
is what states do within the context of that system that is most important.
While the latter two fields offer valuable insights into how the international system
works, I will argue in this paper that realism retains the most relevance in understanding states’
motives. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, in which scholars heralded the “The End of
History”16 and the inevitable triumph of liberal capitalist democracy, conflict endures. Kant’s
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perpetual peace has failed to come to fruition.17 As Mearsheimer bluntly stated, “Alas, the claim
that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the
international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting
peace among the great powers was stillborn.”18 Mearsheimer, one of the most highly regarded
scholars in the field of realism, poignantly sums up this tragic inevitability in his seminal work,
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer writes that hopes for peace will probably not
be realized due to the reality that great powers, fearing each other, are fated to clash for
advantage over one another… He acknowledges the tragic irony of this situation but affirms that
this scenario is bound to continue indefinitely.19
Within Realism, there is a further differentiation that seek to account for the nature of the
international structure. One group of thought pursues a notion of defensive realism. This
argument, advanced by political scientists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz claims
that states are not inherently aggressive, rather that their primary motives are survival and
security.20 Such a case purports that the preservation of balance is an intrinsic objective for most
states. Hans Morgenthau distinguishes between status quo states, those states who desire to
simply exist within the system as it is, and revisionist powers who look to change the
international system.21 However, it is important to note that even while Morgenthau admits to the
presence of revisionist states, this is only a temporary status that is resolved once equilibrium is
reinstated. Some scholars, such as Timofey Bordachev22 and Randall Schweller,23 explain
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Russia’s rise in such a lense. These authors argue that Russia is not a dangerous revisionist state,
rather that it is working well within the international framework to develop as a nation without
objectives to destabilize the international order.
This argument is not accepted by all realist scholars. Other scholars, such as John
Mearsheimer24 and Robert Gilpin,25 represent another group of thought, that of offensive realism.
This theory agrees upon the principle of security being paramount, however, it diverts from that
of defensive realism in that the two arguments conflict over the question of how much power
states want. Mearsheimer’s ideology states that status quo powers rarely, if ever, exist in the
international system, because states are constantly attempting to maximize their relative power
so as to improve their security. The moment these states have the ability to alter the balance of
power in favor of themselves, these states will take advantage of the opportunity to act. Thus
offensive realism forwards the idea that the maximization of power is what states seek, not
simply status quo. In thinking about Russia, it is clear that the model of offensive Realism is
much better suited as a model in explaining Russia’s great power ambitions. Such an argument is
supported by Russian scholars, who view Russia’s aggressive actions in the 21st century as a
pursuit for great power ambitions through offensive, expansionist foreign policy.26 In particular,
scholars have noted Russia’s offensive actions in the Middle East. This case study is explicative
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of the offensive realist perspective, and offers a clear example of Russia’s attempts at regaining
great power.
General Theories on the changes in the International System:
To understand the changes (and continuities) of great power politics, one must
understand the international system in which states operate. Gilpin explains that the international
system exists for reasons similar to any social or political system, in that the actors enter social
relationships and create structures to advance their political or economic interests.27 The overall
system typically reflects the interests of the most powerful members within the social system.
Thus, according to Gilpin,28 the international system begins in a state of equilibrium or stability,
that is, under the presumption that no state believes that it is profitable to change the system.
Change occurs when a state believes that the expected benefits will exceed the expected costs,
through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change
are either equal to or greater than the marginal benefits. Equilibrium is established, although
Gilpin notes that there is a tendency for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise
faster than the economic capacity of supporting the status quo, thereby often resulting in
disequilibrium. Change in the international system will continue until a new equilibrium is
established, reflecting a new redistribution of powers. Gilpin’s argument is interpreted by John
Ikenberry who writes that the main cause of cyclical change occurs when there is an inevitable
shift of power from the core to the periphery. As this shift occurs, hierarchical structures break
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down and competition ensues.29 In essence, the systemic change refers to the replacement of a
declining power by the rise of another new dominant power.
Other scholars profess a different world theory. George Modelski studies the cyclical
patterns of world politics in his work, Principles of World Politics. Modelski defines a cycle as
“a recurrent pattern in the life (or functioning) of a system.”30 He further qualifies it by stating
that if the recurrence takes place in a pattern that is predictable, such behavior can then be
labelled as cyclical or periodic.31 Modelski identifies consistent variables in each world cycle,
noting the presence of a period of weak organization that dissolves into global war,32 that then
gives way to a new world order organized under a peace settlement. He finds that this settlement
endures for approximately a generation at which point this structure again begins to break down
and competitors begin to vie again for a new world order that favors the challengers in a more
advantageous manner.33
When discussing the international system or a world order, political scientists also
observe the polarity of the system, referring to the number of Great Powers that are influencing
the system. In reality, many countries are constantly influencing the international system at any
given time, therefore it might be argued that the world is intrinsically multipolar. While there is
validity in this statement, the variety of polarity systems is widely recognized. For example,
preceding World War 1, the world was seen as a multipolar system, as the Concert of Europe
dominated the international system between several competing states. The beginning of the Cold
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War ushered in a period of bipolarity, in which countries gravitated to the United States and the
ideals of liberal democracy or to the USSR and the ideology of Communism. Following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, many scholars heralded the age of American unipolarity.
Different systems entail different security considerations. For example, Mearsheimer claims that
multipolar systems are more war prone than bipolar systems for several reasons. He explains that
in a multipolar world, there are more opportunities for war as there are more potential conflict
dyads. Furthermore, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world resulting
in great powers having a greater ability to win a war, thus making deterrence more difficult.
Finally, the potential for miscalculation increases and states are more apt to make rash decisions
without careful consideration of the effects of war.34 Bipolar systems, as the name implies, are
considered to be the most balanced as the two major forces only have to consider the motives
and objectives of one main opposition. Finally, unipolarity is considered to be the least stable of
all structures, since any great concentration of power threatens the security of others and results
in such states working to restore a balance.35 Therefore, it is the system least often encountered
and the moment of unipolarity often passes away hastily.
Today, there is much evidence to claim that this moment has indeed passed for the United
States. The rise of China and the resurgence of Russia point to the potential of impending
conflict as the United States attempts to retain its position of power. Although neither China nor
Russia (or any other state for that matter) possess nearly the same economic or military might as
the United States, their growing strength is nonetheless a reality. Another bipolar situation
between the United States and Russia is unlikely given the current state of Russia, as well as the
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number of other states that possess nuclear capabilities. Scholars are also skeptical about the
concept of a multipolar future, as nonstate actors have taken on just as important a role in
international affairs as states. One scholar, Richard Haas, has even gone as far as to predict a
nonpolar future arguing that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power thus defeating the
concept of a state driven international system.36 Therefore, in considering Russia’s expansionist
tendencies today, it is more likely that it is an attempt to simply acquire more relative power
from its competitors rather than an indication of total hegemony. Keeping in mind that this is
always the long term goal of any state, Russia’s actions now seem to indicate a more short term,
practical objective of regaining its status as a relevant and important international actor.

Objectives of States:
This segues into understanding what the primary objectives of states are. Mearsheimer
claims that the overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power by pursuing
the status of regional or global hegemony,37 a concept that will be explained momentarily.
Specifically, Mearsheimer argues that states pursue this objective by gaining power at the
expense of other states.38 Of course, states must consider the relative nature of the international
system. All measures of power are contingent on the power of the states around them. As Gilpin
writes, the abundance or security of a nation’s power and riches matters little if it’s neighbor
possesses more.39 Due to the fact that power is relative, the rise or decline of one state by
definition entails the decline or rise of another. Thus states must take into account the manner in
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which they can advance their own strength to lessen their neighbors. Mearsheimer elaborates,
arguing that states look for opportunities to alter the balance of power in their favor by obtaining
increments of power, whether through economic, diplomatic, or military means in a zero sum
fashion.40 This security dilemma, as it is commonly referred to as, is explained concisely by John
Herz. Herz writes that as strates strive to attain security from neighboring attacks, they are driven
to acquire more and more power to better protect themselves. This, in turn, renders the opposing
powers to become more insecure in comparison. Thus, power competition ensues, and the
“vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”41 Waltz theorizes that states’ first and
foremost concern is to maintain their position in the system.42 Gilpin too agrees that states first
look to secure themselves in the international system. Once the position of the state is ascertained
in the international system, Gilpin would argue that the second objective of states is to maximize
their influence over the behavior of rival states whether through threats, coercion, alliances, or
exclusive spheres of influence. This behavior allows states to create an international environment
of which they design the rules of the system. This system is made to be conducive to the
fulfillment of the state’s political, economic, and ideological interests.43 This follows in tandem
with Gilpin’s other understanding of states’ objectives, that is to influence the world economy
and the international division of labor in an advantageous manner.44
Many scholars argue that the ultimate goal of states is to become a hegemon. Scholars
define hegemony as “the leadership of one state (the hegemon) over other states in the system.”45
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Mearsheimer classifies hegemons as the sole great power in the system.46 He further dilineates
by stating that such a power should be so distinguished from its peers that no other state would
have the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it.47 Scholars note a distinction
between global hegemons, those powers who dominate the entire international system, and
regional hegemons, those which dominate distinct geographical areas.48 The United States, for
example, is and has been a regional hegemon because it remains unchallenged for superiority by
other countries in the northern hemisphere. All other states, therefore, either aim to achieve this
status, or to surpass it by becoming the strongest player in the international system.

Great Power Status:
Although nations aspire to be hegemons, more often states reach the title of “Great
power.” Scholars vary broadly on how they choose to label a state as a great power. Power itself
is a difficult concept to quantify. As acknowledged by Levy, many scholars have chosen either
not to attempt to define the concept or have made little to no effort to translate ambiguous
concepts into meaningful operational criteria.49 Robert L. Rothstein, for example, suggests that
the lack of a clear definition could be due to the commonly held belief that such a distinction
between Great Powers and other, weaker states is self-evident, therefore not requiring exact
quantitative variables.50 Waltz makes a similar comment, making a comparison between
counting the number of great powers in an era to counting how many major firms populate an

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. P. 2
Ibid. P. 97.
48
Ibid. P. 97.
49
Levy, Jack S. War in the Modern Great Power System. UP of Kentucky, 2015. P. 10.
50
Rothstein, Robert L., and Columbia University. Institute of War Peace Studies. Alliances and Small Powers. New
York: Columbia UP, 1968. P. 14.
46
47

oligopolistic sector of an economy.51 His argument is that an understanding of great power status
often comes from common sense but can be difficult to quantify. Scholars also contend with
when a Great Power has successfully reached the status of greatness necessary for qualification
into the “common sense” grouping. It seems apparent that it is more of a general process rather
than the result of a specific or single event. Some scholars only consider changes over the course
of one century to another.52 Other scholars such as Michael Haas constructed a set of entry and
departure dates that were instrumental in formulating system transformation over the last three
centuries.53 Most often, these dates correlate to the end of a decisive war for the aforementioned
reasons of military capability being so crucial in great power status. Again, it is more frequently
correlated with long term development and noticeable economic shifts rather than a specific date
that demarcated a great power’s status.
Over time, scholars have attempted to identify the markers of state power and the
variables that contribute to this power. In Gilpin’s work, he defines the power of a state simply in
terms of the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states.54 E.H. Carr, on the other
hand, focuses on a nation's “power of opinion”, referring to the intangible psychological aspects
of powers within international relations.55 Modelski characterizes great or world powers as those
that control or substantially control the global political system. According to Modelski, these
powers do not control national or local political systems or processes, rather the identity, values,
and resources of that power shape the international system.56 Mearsheimer states that power
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represents nothing other than the specific assets or material resources that are available to the
country, however the actual practical use of that power is a state’s ability to force another to do
something in accordance to the first power’s desires.57 Other variables such as leadership,
strategic ability, regime type, etc., are considered integral to power by other scholars. For
example, Henry Kissinger once claimed, “Military muscle does not guarantee political influence.
Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able to obscure
economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence even when they have neither military
nor economic strength.”58

Explanatory Variables of Great Power:
Each of these aforementioned definitions of great power are largely theoretical. However,
scholars have also made an effort to identify and label certain explanatory variables which
separate Great Powers from their weaker counterparts. As previously stated, military power is
often the primary characteristic of a Great Power. Indeed, the majority of scholars most directly
correlate Great power status with military might. For example, Alan Taylor argues that the test of
a Great Power is their preparation for war.59 David Singer and Thomas Cusack further this notion
by claiming that the most apparent attribute of a great power is its ability to wage war at frequent
intervals with a high success rate.60 Hans Morgenthau claims that armed strength as a threat or a
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potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation.”61
Leopold Ranke purported that a Great Power must have the capability to fight against any other
power, even if they are united,62 although several scholars have since criticized the claim as
being too sweeping in terms of its criterion. Levy counters Ranke’s definition, arguing that it is
too exclusionary.63 The conversation has continued with the introduction of new authors who
have modified Ranke’s concept. For example, Michael Hass rectifies the original definition by
stating that a Great Power should not be defeated in battle by another single power, however, a
combination of other powers could defeat said Great Power.64 Although this definition does not
wholly clarify the ambiguity of great statehood, it does more fairly acknowledge the role that
many powers play in the world stage today. To understand the relationship between multiple
existing Great Powers, Martin Wight quantifies a Great Power as one that could take on another
Great power in single combat.65 Mearsheimer argues that the qualification of a great power is
dependent on a state possessing sufficient military assets to challenge the most powerful state in
the system in an all out conventional war. He modifies this by saying that the candidate does not
need to win, however, it must have some reasonable prospect of creating a war of attrition that
leaves the dominant state severely weakened.66 Rothstein takes the position that a Great Power
has the luxury of relying on its own capabilities to provide for its security, whereas small powers
must rely on external alliances and international institutions.67 Similarly, Stanley Hoffman argues
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Great Powers provide for their security without severely undermining their independence as
opposed to small powers which are forced to choose between security and autonomy.68
That being said, scholars consider other variables beyond pure military might, as well as
the variables that contribute to such strength. Rob de Wijk characterises a country’s power by its
population size, territory, economy, military apparatus, technology, and political and strategic
culture.69 Mearsheimer defines a subset of state power, identified as latent power. Latent power
refers to the societal resources available to states that can be utilized to build military forces. The
most important examples of these resources, according to Mearsheimer, are the size of a state’s
population and the wealth of the nation.70 He distinguishes latent wealth from mobilizable
wealth, which he defines as “the economic resources a state has at its disposal to build military
forces.”71 These resources must be immediately available for defense expenditure as the name
implies. Waltz claims that the rank of a nation depends on a variety of factors including the size
of their population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength,
political stability and competence.72 Population size has long been considered a critical element
to great power status because according to some scholars, only large populations can produce
great wealth which is the building block of military power.73 Wealth is important because money
and technology are essential in equipping, training, and modernizing a state’s fighting forces.
Furthermore, the cost of waging great power wars are enormous...Accordingly, the great powers
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in the international system are invariably among the world’s wealthiest states.74 This is further
supported by Davis and North who claim that a steady rate of economic growth, as well as a
noticeable population shift might be the most significant cause of political change over a long
period of time.75 Paul Kennedy’s study of Great Powers find a clear connection in the long run
between an individual Great Powers economic rise its growth as an important military power.76
For example, Kennedy considers the move in trade flows from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic
and northwestern Europe from the 16th century forward, finding that such an economic shift
“heralded the rise of new Great Powers which would one day have a decisive impact upon the
military/territorial order.”77

Russian Great Power:
The story of Russian Great Power is typically traced to the reign of Peter the Great whose
unification and modernization of the country catapulted the nation’s rise.78 Jack Levy goes as far
as to mark 1721 as a watershed year, marking Russia’s entrance into the modern great power
system.79 Other authors, such as Iver Neumann, mark Russia’s attainment of great power status
as following the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.80 While dates are debated its indisputable that the
Russian state has been instrumental in international history. Its vast geography, in addition to its
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sizable population and economic stature marked Russia as a main competitor in international
politics up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 1990s in Russia were marked by extreme
recession, in terms of economy and military strength. GDP growth remained in the negative for
almost the entire decade as inflation soared and incomes plummeted.81 In the military sector,
weapons spending in 1992 was around 75% less than in 1988 and almost all of Russia’s arms
production had paused.82 Its status as a “Great Power” seemed to wane as internal problems
overrode the states’ ability to exert itself on the international stage.
In general, scholars account for great power decline by identifying several factors. Most
pertinent to a state’s decline is its economic situation. Gilpin supports this statement, arguing that
that “perhaps the most significant changes that undermine the power of the dominant state are
structural changes in its economy.”83 Economic stagnation results in the erosion of military
strength, economic inefficiency, and decline in military and economic competitiveness.84
Ikenberry extracts five specific processes from Gilpin’s research:the declining rates of economic
growth; rising costs of the military; the tendency for public and private consumption to increase;
the trend of economic activity to transition to services; and the “corrupting influence of
affluence.”85 Each of these variables erode the state’s ability to maintain dominance or
hegemony. Most specifically, a country’s power begins to decline when it begins to divert its
resources away from productive investment and instead towards system maintenance and
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protection. Paul Kennedy argues that “Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by
spending more on ‘security,’ and thereby divert potential resources from ‘investment’ and
compound their long-term dilemma.”86 In exerting more resources on system maintenance, states
inherently compromise economic growth. It becomes more difficult to generate the necessary
revenue for protection costs, while at the same time protection costs rise in tandem. The
preservation of status quo dominance becomes more tenuous and eventually the international
system enters a state of disequilibrium. According to Gilpin, “disequilibrium entails a disjuncture
between the basic components of the existing international system and the capacity of the
dominant state or states to maintain the system, between the costs of defending the existing
distribution of territory, spheres of influence, rules of the system, and international economy, on
the one hand, and the revenues necessary to finance these arrangements. This divergence
between costs and resources in turn produces a ‘fiscal crisis’ for the dominant power or powers.
The consequence of continuing disequilibrium and of the financial drain it entails if it is not
resolved is the eventual economic and political decline of the dominant power.”87 A rising
economic power then typically takes advantage of the state of affairs and surpasses the declining
power thus creating a new balance of power.
Russia’s fall was perhaps more unique than others, as it was the endgame of an
ideological war that had existed for decades. No expert or scholar foresaw the coming demise of
the Soviet Union, although in hindsight scholars have noted several explanatory variables. One
school of thought places the most emphasis on economic stagnation as causing the fall, whereas
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another would highlight social and intellectual modernization as the cause.88 Internal pressures
certainly played a role, as did the permittance of elections with a multi-party system which paved
the way for democratization. The introduction of the policies of glasnost and perestroika were
also considered integral to loosening the control of the authoritarian state over the market and
over its satellite states. The failure to reform the market resulted in an accumulation of economic
pressure that eventually became unsustainable. The outcome in 1991 was the end of an empire
and the death of an ideology. The international bipolar system had ended and the balance of
power shifted to the United States which then stood alone as the singular hegemon remaining.

The Literature on Resurgence and the Middle East:
While the literature is well developed on the topic of great power status and the moments
in which states become great powers, there is a gap in the literature on the topic of “resurgent
powers”. Although the term “resurgent Russia” is used frequently in headlines and news articles,
the literature on resurgent states as a theme are scarce. The word resurgence is defined as “an
increase or revival after a period of little activity, popularity, or occurrence.”89 While the
aforementioned literature speaks to the rise and fall of great powers, it does little to inform us on
the topic of “resurgence” or how great powers return from periods of ruin. Indeed, after Russia’s
collapse, many labelled the nation as permanently deceased. Some prescient scholars, such as
Bruce Porter, warned of the need to alter this mentality. Quoting Alexis Tocqueville, Porter
reminds us that “the essential ingredients of state power over the long run provide a much needed
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corrective, for the ingredients ultimately matter more than economic fluctuations, political crises,
or near-term shifts in the military balance.”90
Only as the 21st century unfolded did the conversation surrounding “resurgence” begin to
surface. In reference to Russia, it is clear that scholars, journalists, and experts are referring to its
revived presence in the international system from a geopolitical standpoint. It is poorly defined
in terms of precise, identifiable variables. Instead, scholars seem to refer to a general, identifiable
trend of outward international aggression. Aggarwal and Govella defend their claim that Russian
behavior is resurgent because they argue that the qualities of Russia’s current foreign policy is
focused on bolstering Russia’s prestige, encouraging economic recovery, and extending
influence into its “near abroad”.91 Many scholars see this as an attempt to regain its lost great
power status as a distinctive marker of prestige and recognition.
In beginning to redevelop its international prowess, the Russian government has looked
to capitalize upon its regional geopolitical situation. Pertinent to Russia’s developing presence is
the Kremlin’s interest in the Middle East, and how it has utilized its newfound power to
capitalize on the current events occurring around its borders. Such interest has become so intense
92

that it has become “the most active it has been since the heyday of the Cold War.” The Middle
East is an integral geopolitical location in Russia’s resurgent objectives. This particular focus has
much to do with the Middle East’s central location between Africa, Asia, and Europe, as well its
enormous energy resources, and its volatile political instability in recent years. Russia has finally
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succeeded in opposing the United States in its previously dominant role in the region. Indeed,
“Nowhere did Russia’s reemergence on the world stage have more impact than the turbulent
Middle East.”93 The Middle East has been integral to Russia’s offensive foreign policy,
fomenting its resurge back into the international arena.
Although Russia has worked painstakingly to rebuild its influence and standing in the
region since the mid-2000s, its efforts only began to pay off meaningfully in the wake of the
Arab Spring at which point Russia’s resurgence was imminent, only becoming more apparent
94

during its combat deployment in 2015. Most western critics have claimed that these changes are
the result of Putin being a “deliberately destructive player in the Middle East by manipulating the
untraditional but potentially dangerous post-Cold War order to strengthen its own standing in the
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world.” There is consensus that Russia often acts in an attempt to insert itself on the
international stage at the expense of the United States, its longtime rival, in a zero-sum game
96

fashion. Having been treated as an irrelevant player in 2003, when the United States decided to
invade Iraq, and then again in 2011 when the United Nations decided to depose Libyan leader
Muammar Qaddafi, it is not surprising that the Kremlin has developed this zero-sum game
mentality. Scholars label Russia’s foreign policy style in the Middle East as coming from a place
of “pragmatism and political realism, characterized by a willingness to deal with all relevant
players, treating no one wholly as an ally or wholly as an adversary...maintaining a clear focus
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on Russia’s own national interests.” While Russian officials often claim today that their main
concern stems from respect for human rights and international law, most are cognizant of the fact
that this is most likely not true. Rather, scholars today mostly agree that while Russia puts efforts
98

forth “to act under the guise of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and claims to endorse international
99

law and cooperation, its focus is most likely more towards strengthening its international
prestige and to create a balance of power in the world, “despite all the rhetoric in Moscow of
endorsing international law and cooperation.”
Out of the variety of events that have occurred in recent years “Moscow in the first
decade of the twenty-first century stood accused of passing on nuclear technology (Iran); illicit
sales of advanced conventional weapons (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah); hindering UN Resolutions on
the Security Council; political cover and support for terrorist organizations (Hamas, Hezbollah);
and blocking peaceful democratic development (Syria, Lebanon and indirectly Iraq).100 Russia’s
new role and identity had its roots in the late Yeltsin era, but the Putin era witnessed the
emergence of an assertive Russia that by 2013 subtly deflated the balloon of US power by
cleverly manipulating developments in the Middle East including Iraq, Lebanon, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Syrian revolution and, other regional issues.”101 Many scholars
agree that “Russia’s comeback in the Middle East is real and incontestable.”102
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Aside from the current instability within certain regions of the Middle East, Russian
statesmen have long prioritized the maintenance of strong relationships with the states which
comprise the Middle East. There are a variety of factors that have contributed to this
preoccupation. The first reason comes simply from the proximity of the Arab world to the
southern border of Russia. The Russians often discuss this in terms of Russia’s “soft underbelly”
103

an area that is often prone to be porous and less secure. Although there is some buffer from

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), these countries too are often exposed to
permeable borderlines104 thus creating a problem for Moscow. Having lost the former Soviet
state buffers, along with the rise of terrorism, has reamplified the need to secure the south.
Russia’s worries have “long focused on the possibility that political instability in a neighboring
country will involve Russia in violent unrest. Russia also fears that political change in those
countries is a harbinger of instability to come within its own borders.”105 The notion of
prioritizing the southern border was heavily popularized by one of Russia’s most famous
statesmen, Yevgeny Primakov, who is credited with giving “a clear formulation of Russian
foreign policy and the introduction of new ideas and directions during his tenure as Foreign
Minister.”106 Primakov, in particular, had been intent on emphasizing Russia’s greatness within
global affairs and had a particular interest in the Middle East after the immediate fall of the
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Soviet Union, however his efforts were stymied by the domestic crises within Russia during the
time, and so failed to enact much policy outside of Russia’s immediate borders.107
Another natural reason for Russia to focus its foreign policy on the Middle East has
historically been its desire to access warm water ports. Russia already has access to the eastern
area of the Black Sea’s coastline, thus providing a waterway to the Mediterranean sea. However,
Arab Meditterranean states “are located close to transportation lines crucial for Russian relations
with the southern hemisphere, and they represent an important strategic interest to Moscow.”108
The centrality of the eastern Mediterranean has been pertinent to Russian strategic thought since
1770 when the tsars first gained access to the waters and it has remained a central theme of
national interest since then.109 Today, there is plenty of evidence which supports the claim that
“Putin’s Russia is determined to have access to the warm seas and the world’s oceans.”110
The Middle East’s notoriety around oil, which has attracted foreign actors for decades,
has also been a focal point of Russian foreign policy. Russia itself is one of the worlds’ major
oil-producing nations and so communication between Moscow and top oil-producing states in
the Arab states is inexorable. Currently, Russia and MENA “sit on 60% and 63% of the world’s
proven oil and gas reserves, respectively, and produce half of the world’s oil and nearly 40% of
its gas... Any cooperation between these two giant players will, therefore, have significant
implications for global oil and gas markets.”111 The potential for lucrative trade opportunities has
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created a strong incentive for Russia to focus on Gulf Cooperation Council countries, with whom
Russia can have a stake in the international oil and gas economy.
Another, less apparent fixation on the Middle East has to do with Russia’s expansive
Muslim population. Russia is made up of about one hundred ethno national groups of which the
Islamic community makes up more than 15 percent out of the entire population.112 This
population has grown faster than any others within the Russian population and it has been
coupled with a shrinking ethnic Russian population.113 In comparison to EU member states,
Russia has the largest per capita of citizens who avow to being Islamic.114 Although this is not as
prominently noticed as a factor for Russian foreign policy, “Russia, Islam, and Russia’s Muslim
peoples have influenced one another for nearly a thousand years.”115 This has become a more
prevalent concern for Russia in recent years, as the rise of groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS has
resulted in an immense amount of terrorist attacks internationally. For example, Russia’s recent
attempts to work with Iran has been both “because it provides them greater influence in the
Middle East while also acting as a strategic buffer against radical Islam, a threat which is of great
concern to Russia.”116 Once fighting broke out in Syria, this became even more of a priority for
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Russian officials who feared that the return of battle-hardened Russian jihadists (which
numbered up to 7,000 fighters) would return to the country and destabilize internal politics.117
While efforts to improve relations in the Middle East have occurred since the fall of the
Soviet Union, many note the most drastic changes following the events of the Arab Spring.
Although Russia has worked painstakingly to rebuild its influence and standing in the region
since the mid-2000s, its efforts only began to pay off meaningfully in the wake of the Arab
Spring at which point Russia’s resurgence was imminent, only becoming more apparent during
its combat deployment in 2015.118 Most Western critics have claimed that these changes are the
result of Putin being a “deliberately destructive player in the Middle East by manipulating the
untraditional but potentially dangerous post-Cold War order to strengthen its own standing in the
world.”119 Admittedly, there is quite a bit of consensus that Russia often acts in an attempt to
insert itself on the international stage at the expense of the United States, its longtime rival, in a
zero-sum game fashion.120 Having been treated as an irrelevant player in 2003, when the United
States decided to invade Iraq, and then again in 2011 when the United Nations decided to depose
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, it is not surprising that the Kremlin has developed this
zero-sum game mentality.
It is also important to note that the majority of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in the
Middle East do not come from a place of camaraderie. Despite the lengthy history between the
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regions, even during the reign of the Soviet Union, scholars admitted that, “Soviet policy
towards the Arabs does not appear to conform with the traditional theory of alliances - rather
than valuing the Arabs for any positive contribution or single military strength, it is more likely
their weakness that has induced such Soviet support ...Arab political instability, social
contradictions, economic deficiencies, and military vulnerability have been exploited by the
Soviet Union to secure a wide range of objectives, of which strategic mobility is certainly among
the most prominent.”121 This claim was further supported by other research, which claimed,
“Moscow’s aims in the Middle East are the traditional aims of most great powers: to exclude its
rivals from the area, to promote its foreign policy interests broadly, and to assure itself of the
resources and strategic position essential to its security. All other aims, interests, and policy
positions are subordinate to and derivative from these central aims. Moscow has no intrinsic
interest in either stability or instability, peace or war, or, to take a more specific issue, a
Palestinian state or none at all. Its preferences on these issues are subject to change, depending
on its perceptions as to what will best further its core aims.”122 Scholars label Russia’s foreign
policy style in the Middle East as coming from a place of “pragmatism and political realism,
characterized by a willingness to deal with all relevant players, treating no one wholly as an ally
or wholly as an adversary...maintaining a clear focus on Russia’s own national interests.”123
While Russian officials often claim today that their main concern stems from respect for human
rights and international law, most are cognizant of the fact that this is most likely not legitimate.
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Rather, scholars today mostly agree that while Russia puts efforts forth “to act under the guise of
‘humanitarian intervention’124 and claims to endorse international law and cooperation125,, its
focus is most likely more towards strengthening its international prestige and to create a balance
of power in the world, “despite all the rhetoric in Moscow of endorsing international law and
cooperation.”
Analysis:
Russia’s Military Interventionism:
In terms of how Russia has succeeded in reinserting itself within the region, it has
pursued a variety of foreign policy strategies. Amongst these, the most obvious has been
Russia’s direct military presence in the region. The most poignant example of such military
presence came in 2015 when Russia decisively committed itself to the Syrian civil war. Russia’s
involvement has become its biggest combat employment since the Soviet-Afghan War,
ambitiously launched despite not sharing a common border or having any kind of large
independent support126. While there was some vested national security interest involved,
specifically in preventing the aforementioned“battle hardened Russian jihadists” from returning
home if the state failed, it is apparent to most in the international system that Russia’s
involvement was entirely meant to demonstrate their renewed power. This marks the first direct
intervention by both the United States and Russia in a military conflict with both countries
putting troops on the ground, heightening tensions to a level that has been noticeably absent for
several decades. Russia did not originally have specific interests in the country from an oil or

White, S. (2006) Russia: diminished power. In: Fawn, R. and Hinnebusch, R.A. (eds.) The Iraq War: Causes and
Consequences. Series: The Middle East in the International System. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO, p. 72.
125
Nizameddin, Talal. Putin's New Order in the Middle East. London: Hurst &, 2013. P. 5.
126
Trenin, Dmitri. What Is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Polity Press, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/conncoll/detail.action?docID=5145619. P. 31
124

trade standpoint, nor was it in a position to expend a lot of resources.127 Regardless of this,
Vladimir Putin made clear the fact that “Syria would be no Libya.”128 Importantly, the
intervention cost Russia little, requiring some thirty to forty combat aircraft, approximately
twenty helicopters, a few hundred mercenaries, and between 4,000-6,000 ground troops.129
Estimates surrounding the cost of the military operation in the first 20 months lands around only
$2.4 billion, an infinitesimal cost in comparison to the $50 billion annual budget of the Russian
Ministry of Defense.130
There are plenty of indicators of successful payoffs for Russia. the Kremlin’s decision to
act unilaterally in the Syrian civil war broke it out of its political isolation and forced the United
States to restore communication with Russian military personnel.131 Furthermore, the operation
manifested considerable leverage against the United States, decisively returning Moscow to an
important player in power politics. As a result of the Kremlin’s intervention, “There is no
question that Russia’s relatively modest outlay of military power in Syria has paid off
handsomely, and that the Russian military has largely run the show.”132 What might have been a
quick U.S. or NATO intervention to remove Bashar Al-Assad from power became a long drawn
out conflict between two strong, rival powers. In 2015, Assad only retained control over
approximately one sixth of the country’s territory. By the spring of 2018, he held no less than
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57% of the territory and had seized control over principle rebel stronghold.133 In exchange for
Putin’s support, Damascus signed onto a deal promising Russia access to its air and naval bases
for another 49 years.134 This access has established Russia in a region far from home, giving it
entry into an airbase with air-bridges routes over Iran and Iraq, as well as a sea-bridge route to
the Black Sea. Such lenient accessibility it considered unprecedented, especially in the case of a
non-expeditionary military.135 In the early stages of the war, Russia also secured the Khmeimim
air base in Syria, while also permanently settling into the naval facility in Tartus. Such
integration in the region has allowed Russia to train military forces and it has also led to a further
agreement between Russia and Egypt, permitting Russia to use Egyptian air bases when the need
arises.136 In 2017, reports indicated that Russia had potential plans to set up a base at the border
of Libya and Egypt, “ensuring that Russia ties itself to the energy and military sectors of many
countries in the region, giving him leverage and influence.”137
Another striking advantage for the Kremlin has been its ability to test new weapons with
few casualties and train its personnel. Since the beginning of 2018, there has been a recorded
number of 210 new weapons tested and evaluated in Syria.138 Finally, Russia’s active role in
Syria has allowed “Russian military officers are able to hone their combat and tactical skills in
Syria. They work in the country on short 2-3 month shifts. This has allowed me than 48,000
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officers and soldiers to acquire experience in Syria in the space of just two and a half years.”139
By expanding down into the south, Russia has been given a window through which it can closely
observe the strategic tactics of the United States, as well as its NATO partners. Such
authorization has enabled Russia to survey western military technology, to gauge its
effectiveness, and to compare it to its weaponry. This, along with the aforementioned
advantages, strongly support the argument that Russia’s military presence has been pivotal in its
reentry in world politics.
The Role of Arms Sales:
Military prowess has not been Putin’s only vehicle of renewed strength in the Middle
East. Since the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has been known for its leading role in weapons
suppliers which has historically been a point of great pride to the Russian people. It is well noted
that “Russia has been one of the most active players in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region’s armaments market since the mid-twentieth century, using arms exports as an
important policy instrument.”140 During the 1970s, the Soviet Union became the main supplier of
modern weapons systems, offering training courses in Russian military academies, as well as
having its military personnel and technicians serve as advisers to Middle Eastern armed forces,
often in Egypt and Syria.141 By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, it “was the single largest
supplier of conventional weapons to other countries.”142 The importance of these arms transfers
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was that they helped to shape the balance of forces in regional areas, while also functioning as an
element of military assistance programs which could help to achieve strategic objectives and
trade deals. Once the Soviet Union fell, there was a sharp reduction in military expenditure,
dropping between 40 and 50 percent between 1992 to 1995.143 As the defense industry suffered
from both a lack of investment and domestic procurement, many companies were forced to
liquidate leaving few suppliers left.144
Today, Russia has looked to reinsert itself back into the limelight in its role of a
prominent arms exporter and has made tremendous progress since its downfall in 1991. Moscow
has now achieved the role of being the second largest arms exporter145 in the world after the
United States. The Kremlin has looked to the Middle East to rebuild itself in this area as well,
with the Middle East absorbing the largest share of Russian arms exports in 2017146 with over
$15 billion worth of military hardware being exported.147 The demand for arms in the Middle
East is expected to only increase, “driven by ongoing conflicts (such as those in Syria, Yemen,
and Libya), the fragile security situation, and the threat of military confrontation between state
and non-state actors. According to SIPRI, over the last decade, the region’s arms imports grew
by 75% from 20% of the global total in 2009-13 to 35% in 2014-18.”148 Although Russia lags
behind the United States149 as the main Middle East weapons importer, Russia’s outreach has
only increased due to its contacts with Syria, Iran, and other states in the region. If one includes
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the North African countries in addition to the Middle East (MENA), then the region ranks as the
largest recipient of Russian armaments accounting for almost 50% of the total from contracts
with 23 MENA countries. 150In focusing just on the Middle Eastern countries, there are plenty of
examples of renewed Russian arms deals. In 2012, Iraq signed a package worth $4.2 billion,
which at the time was Moscow’s largest arms deal in the region since the Soviet Union’s
dissolution.151 In 2014, Iraq became the second largest importer of Russian military equipment,
importing a variety of weaponry including Su-25 attack aircraft, TOS-1A heavy flamethrower
systems, Mi-28NE and Mi-25M attack helicopters worth 1.7 billion.152 As aforementioned, the
military intervention in Syria has improved Russia’s ability to trade arms as it now has a
platform within the Middle East to test drive and show off new weaponry. Another advantage of
improving weapons distribution has been the fact that the Kremlin “has demonstrated that it is an
important security actor in the MENA region which cannot be ignored.”153

The Role of Diplomacy:
Perhaps the most driving element behind both direct military intervention and trade deals
has been Russia’s efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the region. President Putin’s
diplomatic efforts to improve relationships within the region have been expansive, clearly to
improve Russia’s soft power advantages. For example, in Iran, Russia has spent the last decade
attempting to dilute sanctions against the state and has also aided in the development of a nuclear
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reactor in Bushehr.154 By standing with Iran against the Western coalition, Russia has effectively
won widespread support by citizens throughout the Middle East who see the United States as an
imperialist power in the region. The Kremlin has effectively capitalized on the waning influence
of the United States’ soft power in the region, especially following the 2003 occupation of Iraq,
to shift focus away from the West. Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi has only just recently
signed a strategic partnership with Russia, which would entail further expansion of arms trade,
joint military maneuvers, and the promise to construct a nuclear power plant in Dabaa.155
A more precise form of diplomacy that dominates the relationship between Russia and
the Middle East is energy diplomacy. Energy diplomacy “typically refers to diplomatic and
foreign policy activities conducted by a consumer country to secure access to energy resources
from a producer country, with a view to ensuring security of supply … Energy diplomacy may
also refer to efforts deployed by a producer country to secure access to markets with a view of
attaining security of the demand...T
 he growing rapprochement between Russia and countries in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) encompasses the two forms of energy diplomacy. It
is manifest in enhanced interaction and coordination among oil and gas-producing countries
pursuing common interests...”156 Taken together, the region of MENA and Russia “sit on 60%
and 63% of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves, respectively, and produce half of the world’s
oil and nearly 40% of its gas.”157 Today, energy has become a primary factor of the Russian
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economy, as well as a primary tool for enacting foreign policy. In 2005 while attending the G-8
summit, President Putin boasted that “Russia is the world leader in the energy market, with the
biggest potential in oil, gas, and nuclear power taken together.”158 It is indeed true that Russia has
become the world’s top producer and exporter of oil and natural gas, while also hosting the
largest reserves of gas and uranium.”159 The importance of these resources for Russia’s
international image has become clear by the fact that the official energy strategy of 2003
explicitly mentioned these resources as a political instrument, as did the 2009 security doctrine.
This has resulted in the total state ownership of oil companies including Transneft, which has a
monopoly on oil pipelines, as well as Gazprom which dominates the gas market.160 When the
U.S. sanctions came to fruition in 2014, Russia’s oil prices collapsed, resulting in a decline from
$110 per barrel to less than $60 in just 6 months.161 It was at this time that Russia heavily began
to work with Arab countries, specifically those in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) to improve its dire situation. In 2016, OPEC announced that it would
coordinate a production cut, while also including Russia which, within a year, helped to
restabilize the Russian economy, going from “recession to recovery” as well as the oil industry
which bounced back to valuing oil barrels at $70 in just a few months.162 By 2018, Saudi Arabia
had taken the further step to invite Russia to become an observing member of OPEC, deepening
the relationship from its previous temporary status.
Russia has coupled this style of energy diplomacy with investments funds that look to
attract foreign funds into the country. For example, the Russian Direct Investment Fund, founded
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in 2011, has already attracted $30 billion of foreign capital into the local economy. This capital
has come from partners, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Kuwait Investment
Authority (KIA), Qatar Holding, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), and the DP
World (United Arab Emirates-UAE).163 Energy has overlapped with investments, for example in
the case of Rosneft who is also pursuing investments directly in “oil and gas projects from
Algeria to Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, and Oman, further building closer ties
with various governments and local entities.”164 Russia’s diplomatic return to the region has
ensured that “all geopolitical actors in the region engage with Russia and pay due respect to its
interests.”165 Such skillful statecraft has helped coin the phrase “playing a weak hand well” when
referring to how Russia has managed to exert so much power in recent years despite very much
still being in a recovering stage. Although Russia is not yet the world player that it was in the
Soviet Union, by capitalizing on its strengths Russia has put itself into a position of resurgent
influence in the region of the Middle East.
Conclusion:
Although the resurgence of Russian power has worried Western powers, it should not be
overstated. In spite of the initiatives that the Kremlin has pursued in regaining international
prestige, Russia’s economy remains rather stagnant and it is unlikely that they will regain any
kind of extraordinary military superiority in the near future. The Russian economy retains long
standing constraints on growth, especially as a result of the sanctions implemented against them
following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. The economy is weak in terms of diversification of
exports, is highly dependent on imports of machinery and technologies, and is plagued by high
163
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energy prices.166 Moreover, the fact that many wealthy Russians keep their capital overseas
means that domestic investment remains low.167 The chance of an offensive military operation
committed by Russia is highly unlikely, with NATO investing more and more into the defense
systems of Russia's bordering Eastern European states. The Kremlin seems to also be aware of
this, as they have implemented intensive measures towards developing their cyber capabilities as
a means for asymmetrical warfare. Russia’s other issues, including deep seated corruption,
population decline, and poor infrastructure, only further complicate its attempts to regain a great
power status.
Moving forward, the Russian Federation is likely to continue to invest resources into
asymmetrical means of challenging Western dominance. In the absence of an ability to regain
power through conventional means, the Kremlin will capitalize upon new spaces of power
struggle such as the cyber world or through the weaponization of disinformation. In terms of the
Middle East, Russia is likely to continue to eye it as an important geopolitical area for
challenging Western supremacy, although will most likely not engage in any direct manner.
President Putin will remain pragmatic in his involvement, only extending Russian resources into
the region for clear economic or military return. Altogether, the efforts made by the Kremlin thus
far to regain prestige have been slow and incremental at best, and do not indicate a return to great
power status, in terms of economic or military might, at any point in the near future.
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